CHRISTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MONISM
PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter seeks to address the question: Do monists see only one nature in Christ, and do dualists look for two natures in Christ? Its purpose is to examine historical evidence to determine whether these metaphysical assumptions about God indeed shape what each group perceives in Christ.
Method of Inquiry
The approach taken here will involve examining the primary theological groups previously identified, assessing whether their theological methods were applied consistently to their understanding of Christ. This investigation will proceed generally in historical order. Key groups to be examined include:
The Gnostics – as critiqued by the early church.
Monists versus Dualists – particularly during the seven Ecumenical Councils.
The Maturation of Catholic Natural Theology – examining its impact on Christology.
Development of Protestant Liberalism's Christology – tracing its influences and outcomes.
Additionally, the Christology of certain modern sects will be reviewed, especially regarding how their views may reflect the monistic tendencies of the contemporary church, as evidenced in the development of their own Christological frameworks.
DEFINITION LIMITED TO HOW MANY NATURES CHRIST HAS
In this study, the term Christology specifically pertains to the question of whether Christ possesses one or two natures. Is Christ both fully human and fully divine, or does He have only one nature that accounts for what leads dualists to affirm two distinct natures within one person? This section examines how the church has historically understood the nature(s) of Christ.
GNOSTICISM SAW ALL SPIRITS AS A MONISM
In Chapter 2, it was noted that Gnosticism’s pursuit of “knowledge” (gnosis) through mysteries and rituals to achieve unity with the divine spiritual nature was based on the premise that all spiritual reality emanates from a singular, undivided spiritual source—often referred to as the “ocean” or Bythos, or the “Father.” This source, however, remains ultimately unnameable and can only be experienced through the mystical insight of Gnosticism. Fundamentally, Gnosticism embodied a monistic perspective, emphasizing an essential unity between God and man. Salvation, in the Gnostic view, involved attaining awareness of this unity, representing a liberation from the dualistic division between matter and spirit. Matter was considered evil and separate from the divine; hence, the material world needed to be transcended through knowledge of the true spiritual realm.
The Early Church Opposed Gnosticism
The early church leaders forcefully opposed Gnosticism. The apostle Paul, in his instructions to the Colossians, directly confronted and refuted the Gnostic teachings and beliefs commonly associated with Gnostic teachings.
The Apostle John's Opposition to Gnosticism
The apostle John’s first epistle was also evidently written to counter Gnostic errors, illustrating the early church’s concern with addressing these heretical teachings.
Church Fathers Opposing Gnosticism
Bishop Irenaeus contributed significantly to this effort with his five-volume work, still extant today, explicitly opposing the heresies of Gnosticism. Following him, Hippolytus, in his writings against various heresies, focused considerable attention on the Gnostic teacher Valerius, dedicating more space to refuting his teachings than any other heretic. Similarly, Tertullian frequently referenced Gnostic teachings in his works and even authored a dedicated treatise against them. From this treatise, we learn of other Christians who had also written against the Gnostics, including Justin Martyr, Miltiades, and Proculus.
Clement of Alexandria and Later Critiques of Valentinus
Clement of Alexandria addressed Gnostic claims by directly quoting Valentinus to refute him. After Valentinus’s death, church figures continued to condemn his teachings with strong language. Epiphanius labeled Valentinus as the "chief of heretics," a title that seemed fitting given his influence. Philaster of Brescia further criticized Valentinus, suggesting that he adhered more closely to Pythagorean philosophy than to Christ and that he "led captive the souls of many."
Praedestinatus and Imperial Edicts Against Gnosticism
In Praedestinatus, it is noted that Valentinus and his followers caused significant harm to the Church throughout the East. Eusebius, in his Life of Constantine, records an Imperial edict issued against the Valentinians and other heretics, reportedly proclaimed before the baptism of its author. This edict prohibited these groups from assembling, and it ordered that their “houses of prayer” be confiscated for the Catholic Church’s use.
Destruction of Gnostic Writings
This intense opposition led to the burning and destruction of Gnostic writings, resulting in the near-total loss of their texts.
Irenaeus’ Five Books: A Defense of the Christian God
Much of what we know about Gnostic teachings comes from early church fathers like Irenaeus, who sometimes detailed Gnostic beliefs to refute them. In his five books, Irenaeus consistently emphasized that the Christian God, as revealed in Scripture, is the only true God, distinct from the Gnostic pantheon. While Irenaeus does not directly address Gnostic monism, he challenges their many deities by presenting the Christian God as separate and transcendent, fundamentally dualistic in opposition to the Gnostic system. For example, in Book One, Chapter I, Irenaeus sets forth the Christian concept of a transcendent God, contrasting sharply with the Gnostic idolatrous views of divinity.
The Rule of Truth According to Irenaeus
Irenaeus asserts a foundational principle: “The rule of truth which we hold is that there is one God Almighty, who made all things by His Word.” With this rule in mind, Irenaeus argues that, despite the diversity and abundance of heretical beliefs, these doctrines have strayed from the truth. Most heretical sects, he acknowledges, claim there is one God; however, they distort this truth into error, much like the Gentiles do through idolatry.
Irenaeus on the Christian Pleroma vs. the Gnostic Pleroma
In Against Heresies, Book II, Chapter I, Irenaeus begins by contrasting the Christian concept of Pleroma (or "Fulness") with that of the Gnostics. He emphasizes the supremacy and self-sufficiency of God as the Creator, who made heaven, earth, and everything within them. The Gnostics, however, he notes, blasphemously depict God as an imperfect being, merely a product of some deficiency. Irenaeus refutes this view, affirming that God is the Pleroma—the complete and all-encompassing reality—and that there can be no other Pleroma, Principle, Power, or God beyond Him. If anything existed beyond God, then He would not truly be the Pleroma and would not contain all things.
Refutation of Gnostic Multitudes
Irenaeus does not advocate a pantheistic view of God. Rather, he exposes the Gnostic fallacy of believing in “many Fathers, and many Pleromas, and many creations of worlds.” He elaborates on this point throughout his work, clarifying the singular, transcendent nature of the Christian God.
Irenaeus’ Prayer for Gnostic Conversion
Toward the end of Against Heresies, Book III, Irenaeus prays earnestly for the Gnostics, desiring that they might be freed from their false gods and come to a knowledge of the true God. He writes:
"We do indeed pray that these men may not remain in the pit which they themselves have dug, but separate themselves from a Mother of this nature, and depart from Bythus, and stand away from the void, and relinquish the shadow; and that they, being converted to the Church of God, may be lawfully begotten, and that Christ may be formed in them, and that they may know the Framer and Maker of this universe, the only true God and Lord of all."[^11]
Irenaeus’ Continued Refutation in Book IV
In Book IV, Irenaeus intensifies his critique of the Gnostic conception of God, demonstrating that the true God is distinct from the Gnostic deities. In Chapter III, he addresses their misrepresentations of God through their crude anthropomorphic interpretations:
“Again, as to their malignantly asserting that if heaven is indeed the throne of God, and earth His footstool, and if it is declared that the heaven and earth shall pass away, then when these pass away the God who sitteth above must also pass away, and therefore He cannot be the God who is over all; in the first place, they are ignorant what the expression means, that heaven is [His] throne and earth [His] footstool. For they do not know what God is, but they imagine that He sits after the fashion of a man, and is contained within bounds, but does not contain.”[^12]
Irenaeus points out that the Gnostics, influenced by their monistic view, misconceive the relationship between God and creation. They assume that since God and the heavens-and-earth are interconnected in a monistic sense, the passing of the physical heavens and earth would imply that God Himself would also pass away.
God’s Eternal Transcendence According to Irenaeus
Irenaeus strongly opposes the Gnostic view that when the physical world passes away, God will also cease to exist. He condemns this as “bad theology,” underscoring that God is not human and will remain even after the world fades, as will His faithful servants. For Irenaeus, God’s transcendence is not of an entirely detached, “wholly-other” nature; rather, it is a transcendence that continually contrasts with and surpasses the limited theological concepts held by the Gnostics.
In his fifth book, Irenaeus emphasizes this by confronting the Gnostic belief in a superior, “good” Father above the Creator. He argues that those who “feign the existence of another Father beyond the Creator” are deceived. Irenaeus’s primary focus is not on refuting the Gnostic monistic concept of Bythus (their unnameable spiritual source), but rather on rejecting their denigration of the Christian God to an inferior status within their hierarchy of emanations. By dividing the Gnostic emanations into a multitude of separate deities, Irenaeus reveals the incoherence of their system. In stark contrast stands the transcendent God—the true Father of Jesus Christ—who surpasses and is wholly distinct from the Gnostic multiplicity of limited pleromas (fullnesses).
THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS: MONISM VS. DUALISM
Whether or not there are two separate realities was the basic question and controversy underlying all the ecumenical councils. These questions developed as people tried to understand who Christ is. Is He human or divine? How are the two natures related in Christ?
The presuppositions of the monists were expressed in their interpretation of Christ. Likewise, those who dualistically believed that God is transcendent expressed this view in their interpretation of the person of Christ. These issues were not always clear, and the dualisms were sometimes expressed in other ways, but the controversy between the two viewpoints of monism and dualism was so basic to the development of these councils that it can serve as a key to understanding them.
It is questionable that these councils would have been called if there had not been a question as to whether God and man are two separate realities. Monistic christology could not believe, during these christological debates, that Christ has two natures.
Following is a survey of the seven ecumenical councils showing that each council was concerned about some aspect of whether or not there are two natures in Christ.
Council of Nicaea (325): Affirmation of Christ's Divine Nature
At Nicaea, the church confronted "the most challenging heresy in the history of the church," as historian Will Durant describes it.[^14] The question at stake: Is Christ divine? Arius argued that Christ was merely a man.
Footnotes:
See Harold Lindsell, ed., Harper Study Bible (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 1762.
See Lindsell, p. 1845. (Most commentators recognize the Gnostic dualism between matter and spirit but often overlook the Gnostic monism of all spiritual beings.)
Francis Legge, Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity, From 330 B.C. to 330 A.D., Vol. II (New Hyde Park, New York: University Books, 1964), p. 95, citing Tertullian, Adversus Valentinianos, c. 5.
Legge, Vol. II, p. 95, citing Epiphanius, "Panarion Haereticorum" (Pan. Haer.), xxxi, c. 1, in Corpus Haereseologicum, ed. Franciscus Oehler, vol. III.
Legge, citing Philastrius, "De Haeresibus Liber," I, 138, in Oehler, Corpus Haereseologicum (Berlin: [n.n.], 1856-1861), p. 43.
Francis Legge, Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity, From 330 B.C. to 330 A.D., Vol. II (New Hyde Park, New York: University Books, 1964), pp. 95-96, citing Praedestinatus, Book I, c. 11, in Oehler, Vol. I, p. 235.
Legge, citing Eusebius, Vita Constantini, Book III, Chapters 64, 65.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, in The Apostolic Fathers With Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, ed. A. Cleveland Coxe, Vol. 1, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1953), p. 347, from Book I, Chapter XXII.
Irenaeus, p. 359, from Book II, Chapter I.
Irenaeus, p. 406, from Book II, Chapter XXII.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, p. 460, from Book III, Chapter XXV.
Irenaeus, p. 465, from Book IV, Chapter III.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, p. 530, from Book V, Chapter IV.
Footnote:
14. Will Durant, Caesar and Christ, The Story of Civilization, Vol. III (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 658.
Arius’ View: Defending Monotheism or Embracing Monism?
Arius appeared to be defending a dualistic, biblical view of monotheism, which emphasizes that God is wholly distinct from humanity. Influenced by the Monarchians during his time in Antioch, he focused on preserving the unity and self-contained nature of God, proposing that Christ was a created being. Arius asserted that Christ, like other creatures, was "created out of nothing" and was not homoousion (of the same essence) with the Father. He stated, “The Son has a beginning, but…God is without a beginning.”[^15] Therefore, in Arius’ view, Christ was not eternal.
However, this attempt to protect monotheism failed to acknowledge that the Incarnation sustains the dualism of two natures within one Person. Further examination of Arius’ theology suggests it may reflect a Greek, rather than a purely biblical, understanding of God. Arius considered Christ as the "first-born of creatures," occupying a position slightly lower than God yet superior to man. This effectively made Christ neither fully divine nor truly human. Arius’ version of monotheism, therefore, starts to resemble a form of monism, akin to Greek Gnosticism, which places God at the apex of a hierarchical continuum. By attempting to elevate God, Arius ultimately positions Christ in a monistic framework rather than within the dualistic understanding of Christian theology.
Footnote:
15. Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), pp. 114-115, citing "Arius to Eusebius, Theodoret," in Joseph Cullen Ayer, Jr., A Source Book for Ancient Church History, From the Apostolic Age to the Close of the Conciliar Period (New York: [n.n.], 1913), p. 302.
Arius’ Identification of Christ with the Logos
Arius equated Christ with the Logos, a divine agent who entered a human body and took the place of a human reasoning spirit.[^16]
The Nicene Creed and the Term Homoousion
The pivotal term in the Nicene Creed was homoousion, emphasizing that Christ is “of one essence” with the Father, affirming His true divinity. At the Council of Nicaea, Athanasius emerged as the principal opponent of Arianism. He challenged Arius, leading him to acknowledge that if Christ were not God, He would be susceptible to change, just like any other creature. The Council’s decision, still widely recognized, stated:
"We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten of his Father, of the substance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father."[^17]
This statement from the first ecumenical council clearly upheld the dualism between God and creation. The council affirmed that Christ, the Son of this God, shares the same nature (homoousion) as God.
Council of Constantinople (381): Affirming Christ’s Human Nature
The subsequent council at Constantinople addressed the question of whether Christ is truly human.
Footnotes:
16. Walker, A History of the Christian Church, p. 115.
17. Henry R. Percival, ed., The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, Vol. XIV, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, second series, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, [n.d.]), p. 3.
Council of Constantinople (381): Affirming Christ’s Full Humanity
The question addressed by the Second Ecumenical Council—“Is Christ truly human?”—would have been irrelevant if there was no acknowledgment of the duality between God and created humanity. Apollinaris, a theologian influenced by Platonistic psychology, argued that the Logos assumed a genuine human body and an actual “animal soul” but not a human spirit. Apollinaris’ view was rejected (anathematized) at Constantinople by Athanasius, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and others, who held that Christ was fully and truly human.
Council of Ephesus (431): Is Christ One Person or Two?
The Third Ecumenical Council addressed the question, “Is Christ one or two persons?” This question logically followed the prior affirmations that Christ is both divine (Nicaea) and human (Constantinople). Nestorius, who became the patriarch of Constantinople in 428, actively opposed both Arian and Apollinarian heresies. However, he struggled with the term Theotokos (Mother of God) as a title for Mary, feeling it did not sufficiently distinguish between Christ’s human and divine natures; he preferred the title Christotokos (Mother of Christ). Cyril of Alexandria opposed Nestorius vigorously and successfully called for a council to address the issue. The council ultimately condemned Nestorius, affirming that, while Christ is both divine and human, it is incorrect to describe Him as two separate persons. The specific relationship between His two natures would be further clarified in the following council.
Council of Chalcedon (451): Affirming the Two Natures in One Person of Christ
The Fourth Ecumenical Council at Chalcedon addressed the fundamental question of whether Christ embodies one or two essential realities, and how these realities are united within Him. Eutyches of Constantinople sought to counter Nestorianism by asserting, “I confess that our Lord was of two natures before the union (Incarnation), but after the union, one nature.”[^18] In response, Pope Leo I (440–461) wrote his “Tome,” a letter affirming that in Christ exist two full and complete natures. These natures, Leo argued, are unified in one person without compromising the properties of either nature or substance.
The Council of Chalcedon, convening in 451 A.D., supported this view, resulting in a creed that has been widely accepted by the Greek, Roman, and most Protestant churches as a definitive Christological statement. This creed is noteworthy for its careful articulation of both the transcendent divine nature and the created human nature, emphasizing that in Christ, these two natures are united in such a way that they cannot be separated or confused with each other. The council affirmed Christ’s divine nature as fully consistent with the transcendent God, using phrases that identify His divine essence with that of the Almighty.
Council of Chalcedon: Affirmations of Christ’s Divine and Human Natures
The Council of Chalcedon described Christ’s divine nature using expressions such as:
“…perfect in Godhead…”
“…truly God…”
“…consubstantial (homoousia) with the Father according to the Godhead…”
“…begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead.”[^19]
The council also affirmed Christ’s fully human nature with phrases like:
“…perfect in manhood…”
“…truly man, of a reasonable soul and body…”
“…consubstantial with us according to the manhood, in all things like unto us, (yet) without sin…”
“…born…according to the manhood…”[^20]
To emphasize that Christ’s two natures remain unified within one Person, the council stated:
“…one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, in two natures indivisibly, inseparably, the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one person and one subsistence (hypostasis), not parted or divided into two persons.”[^21]
To prevent any misunderstanding that these two natures might be confused or transformed into each other, the council clarified:
“…in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved…”[^22]
The Chalcedonian Creed is remarkable for its symmetry, carefully balancing each phrase to uphold the dualism of Christ’s divine and human natures.
Footnotes:
19. Walker, A History of the Christian Church, pp. 151-152, citing Ayer, pp. 517-521.
20. Walker, p. 152.
21. Walker, p. 152.
22. Walker, p. 152.
The Chalcedonian Definition of the Two Natures in Christ
The Chalcedonian Creed expresses the perfect and enduring union of Christ's divine and human natures in a single person. It states:
"We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and also perfect in manhood; truly God and truly man, of a reasonable soul and body; consubstantial (homoousion) with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the manhood, in all things like unto us, without sin; begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God (Theotokos), according to the manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably, the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one person (prosopon) and one subsistence (hypostasis), not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ; as the prophets from the beginning have declared concerning Him, and the Lord Jesus Christ Himself has taught us, and the creed of the holy Fathers has handed down to us."[^23]
This statement underscores both the full deity and full humanity of Christ, presenting them as inseparably united yet distinctly preserved within one person.
The Monophysite Response and Subsequent Controversy
Despite the clarity of Chalcedon, some eastern churches found the definition overly aligned with Nestorianism, leading to the rise of the Monophysite doctrine. Monophysitism held that while Christ possessed two natures prior to the Incarnation, they were unified into a single nature thereafter. The ongoing debate about the nature of this union eventually necessitated another general council.
Footnote:
23. Walker, A History of the Christian Church, pp. 151-152.
Council of Constantinople (553): Condemnation of Monophysitism
The Fifth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople focused on condemning the teachings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, who had died over a century prior, but whose writings were influential among Nestorians and Pelagians. Both Theodore and Nestorius hailed from Antioch, and their emphasis on the dual natures of Christ led to accusations of promoting “Nestorianism,” the view that Christ comprises two separate persons.[^24] In the century following the Council of Chalcedon, Monophysite opposition grew, ultimately succeeding in having Theodore’s writings anathematized.[^25]
This long-standing controversy over the number and relationship of natures in Christ highlights the intense theological divisions of the time. The persistence of conflicting beliefs, despite repeated ecumenical condemnations, demonstrates the depth of conviction held by both Nestorians and Monophysites, who continued to propagate their beliefs for centuries.
Limitations of Nestorianism's Dualism
The extreme dualism in Nestorianism reminds us that the term "dualism" should be understood provisionally, not simply as a concept projected from a monistic philosophical framework. Nestorianism’s failure lay in its inability to define the dualism of Christ’s natures in a way that was consistent with Scripture, which ultimately weakened the movement.
Footnotes:
24. Nestorianism in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, ed. Charles G. Herbermann et al. (New York: Robert Appleton Co., 1912), pp. 571-573.
25. Chrys. Baur, “Theodore,” The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, ed. Charles G. Herbermann et al.
Spread and Persistence of Nestorianism and Monophysitism
The Nestorians, whose Christology sharply distinguished between the two natures within Christ (to the extent that it appeared to portray Him as two separate persons, though Nestorius himself denied this extreme view[^26]), developed a strong missionary zeal. They gained a significant following in Syria and found refuge in Persia. By the seventh century, Nestorian missionaries had reached India and China. Today, Nestorian churches still exist in areas of Turkey near ancient Persia and in southern India. In China, the only known remnant of their presence is an inscription on a stone near Hsianfu (modern-day Xi’an), detailing the history and names of missionaries active between 636 and 781 A.D.[^27]
The Monophysites also remained influential in the East, and their legacy continues through the Coptic Church in Egypt and its branch, the Coptic Church in Ethiopia, as well as the Syrian Monophysite (Jacobite) Church, which has about 80,000 adherents mainly in the Tigris Valley. The largest Monophysite group today is the Armenian or Gregorian Church, with potentially several million members.[^28]
Footnotes:
26. Walker, A History of the Christian Church, p. 145.
27. Andrew Miller, Miller's Church History from First to Twentieth Century (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing Company, 1964), p. 296.
28. Walker, pp. 157-159.
Council of Constantinople (680): Affirmation of Two Wills in Christ
The controversy addressed at the Sixth Ecumenical Council centered on Monotheletism—the belief that Christ possessed a single, unified divine-human will. Influenced by Monophysite bishops from Armenia and Syria, Emperor Heraclius endorsed the view that “Christ accomplished His work of redemption by the exercise of one divine human will.”[^29] However, opposition emerged from Sophronius, who later became the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and eventually led to a schism between the Eastern and Western churches.
The Sixth Council ultimately concluded that Christ possesses “two natural wills or willings…not contrary one to the other…but His human will follows, not as resisting or reluctant, but rather as subject to His divine and omnipotent will.”[^30] Through this decision, the church continued to uphold its belief in the dual natures of Christ while refining its understanding of the relationship between His divine and human aspects. The persistent divisions that necessitated these ecumenical councils illustrate the deep theological conflicts within the church.
Footnotes:
29. J. L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought, Vol. I (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1946), citing J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio, Vol. XI ([n.n.], old print, 1798; new print, 1903), pp. 564-568.
30. Neve, p. 136.
Council of Nicaea (787): The Shift Toward Monism Through the Use of Images
The Seventh Ecumenical Council, held at Nicaea in 787, represents a point of theological contention, especially among Protestant reformers who later rejected its conclusions. This council redefined the concept of the divine nature, asserting that it could be monistically understood by man through images. By endorsing a monistic view of God, the council altered the established ontological dualism between God and the created world to a "relative dualism," implying that God was no longer wholly distinct from creation.
This decision held profound Christological implications. By decreeing the use of images to represent God, the council suggested that Christ’s divinity, like His humanity, could be depicted visually. In essence, it implied that the divine nature, once considered transcendent and beyond human comprehension, could now be known in a similar manner to the human nature of Christ. The decree from the Council of Nicaea II stated:
"We…define…that… the venerable and holy images, as well in painting and mosaic as of other fit materials, should be set forth in the holy churches of God, and on the sacred vessels and on the vestments and on hangings and in pictures both in houses and by the wayside, to wit, the figure of our Lord God and Saviour Jesus Christ…"
This shift to the use of images symbolized a move from the strict separation of Creator and creation to a view where the divine could be represented and, in a sense, comprehended through material forms.
Factors Leading to the Church’s Shift on Images at Nicaea II
The decision at the Second Council of Nicaea (787) to endorse the use of images representing God marked a significant shift in church doctrine, effectively reversing earlier positions. Various historical and philosophical influences contributed to this change, particularly the adoption of allegorical interpretation and Neo-Platonic thought.
Allegorical Interpretation
The rise of allegorical interpretation, which allowed for non-literal readings of Scripture, made biblical texts more adaptable to the interpreter’s perspective. According to Bernard Ramm, “The allegorical system that arose among the pagan Greeks, copied by the Alexandrian Jews, was next adopted by the Christian church and largely dominated exegesis until the Reformation.”[^32] Origen, a significant influence on early Christian thought, promoted the idea that Scripture contained multiple levels of meaning, which detracted from its plain sense.[^33] Over time, this approach contributed to Scripture’s becoming subservient to broader theological frameworks, accommodating views that permitted the use of images.Neo-Platonism and Mysticism
Neo-Platonism, which asserted that the divine was present within all reality, further influenced Christian thought and contributed to the rise of mysticism. Mystics, drawing on Neo-Platonic ideas, believed that the divine essence was diffused through all human souls. According to Richard Watson, the mystics viewed God as being beyond the material world, yet accessible through spiritual images and symbols.[^34]
These influences contributed to the church’s adoption of a monistic understanding, ultimately leading to the decision at Nicaea II, which approved the use of images not only of Christ but of “all saints, etc.”[^31]
Footnotes:
31. Percival, The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, p. 550.
32. Bernard Ramm, Protestant Biblical Interpretation (Boston: W. A. Wilde Company, 1956), p. 28.
33. Merrill F. Unger, Unger’s Bible Dictionary (Chicago: Moody Press, 1957), p. 37.
34. Richard Watson, A Biblical and Theological Dictionary (New York: Carlton and Phillips, 1853), p. 682.
The Influence of Neo-Platonism and Mysticism on the Veneration of Images
The Neo-Platonic view of God as beyond all duality influenced the church’s acceptance of mysticism, which presented God as unknowable through language since language requires definition and distinctness. According to this monistic view, God could only be known through mystical vision or indescribable experience, making mysticism appear as the suitable means for communion with Him. As noted in Collier’s Encyclopedia, “No language was so ineffable that it could communicate the knowledge of God.”[^35] In Neo-Platonism, Neve explains, "the world first emanates from God and then returns to Him,” reinforcing the monistic cycle of emanation and return.[^36]
Church figures like Basil and John of Damascus turned to images as vehicles for worshiping this otherwise incomprehensible God.[^37] These influences, rooted in Greek monistic thought, shaped what Harnack described as “Christianity’s Second Order” (Christentum zweiter Ordnung), a form of Christianity that emerged and gained strength from the fourth century onward.[^38] This “Second Order” thinking culminated in the formalization of the veneration of images at the Seventh Ecumenical Council.
Neve also highlights the impact of Monophysitism as a significant component of Greek piety that helped pave the way for the church’s endorsement of images.
Footnotes:
35. "Neo-Platonism," Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. XVI, p. 129.
36. J. L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought, Vol. I, p. 24.
37. John of Damascus, "Exposition of the Orthodox Faith," in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), p. 274.
38. Neve, p. 168.
The Picture of Jesus as a Symbol of His Deity and the Church’s Struggle with Monism
While the picture of Jesus as a man was increasingly viewed as a symbol of His deity,[^39] the church did not readily adopt this form of monism. Initially, image worship emerged as a popular practice without formal endorsement, and church leaders initially opposed the use of such images. This resistance is evident in earlier writings and was strongly expressed during the Iconoclastic Controversy, including the Iconoclastic Council (Conciliabulum) of Constantinople in 754 A.D., which condemned image worship—a decision later overturned by the Second Council of Nicaea.
The Iconoclastic Controversy: Dualism Versus Monism
The Iconoclastic Controversy was influenced by accusations from Jews and Muslims, who viewed the Christian use of images as idolatrous. Christians faced frequent accusations of idolatry, being derisively labeled as idolaters by both groups.[^40] In response, Emperor Leo III of Constantinople issued an edict in 726 A.D. against the worship of images, ordering them to be placed at heights where people could not touch or kiss them superstitiously. This edict, however, met with fierce opposition from the church, sparking civil unrest and even war across both the Eastern and Western regions.
Footnotes:
39. J. L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought, pp. 168-169.
40. Andrew Miller, Miller's Church History from First to Twentieth Century (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing Company, 1964), p. 289.
Emperor Leo III’s Campaign Against Images and the Church’s Opposition
Following fierce resistance to his initial edict, Emperor Leo III intensified his campaign against images in Constantinople. After crushing an armed rebellion by those who opposed him, Leo issued a second edict mandating the destruction of all religious images and ordered that the walls bearing these paintings be whitewashed. His army carried out these commands, inciting the crowds, who responded with violence, attacking and even killing Leo’s officers in an outburst of religious zeal. In one incident, an officer sent to destroy a well-known statue of Christ was killed by an enraged crowd, leading to a massacre as the army clashed with the people. In the place where the statue once stood, Leo erected an inscription prohibiting images.[^41]
Papal Opposition to Iconoclasm
Pope Gregory II strongly opposed Leo’s orders to destroy images, defending the practice with insights into the Christology of the time. Gregory argued that Christian images differ fundamentally from pagan idols; while pagans worship representations of demons, Christians venerate true representations of Christ and the saints. According to Gregory, biblical prohibitions on idolatry applied specifically to pagan idols, not to Christian images, which serve to inspire piety rather than idolatrous worship.
Footnotes:
41. Miller, Miller’s Church History from First to Twentieth Century, citing J. C. Robertson, Vol. II, p. 83, and Milman, Vol. II, p. 156.
Papal Defense and Promotion of Religious Images
Pope Gregory II defended the use of images, claiming they fostered his personal edification, and his description reveals the typical themes in church art of that time. These images included:
The miraculous portrait of Christ sent to King Abgarus of Edessa,
Scenes of the Lord’s miracles,
The Virgin Mary with the infant Jesus, surrounded by angelic choirs,
The Last Supper,
The raising of Lazarus,
The healing of the blind, paralytic, and leper,
The feeding of the multitudes,
The Transfiguration, Crucifixion, burial, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ,
The descent of the Holy Spirit,
The sacrifice of Isaac.[^42]
Gregory’s successor, Pope Gregory III, was even more ardent in his support for images. He convened a council of 93 bishops from Northern Italy, who unanimously decreed:
"If any person should hereafter, in contempt of the ancient and faithful customs of all Christians, and of the apostolic Church in particular, stand forth as a destroyer, defamer, or blasphemer of the sacred images of our God and Lord Jesus Christ, and of His mother, the immaculate ever-Virgin Mary, of the blessed apostles, and all other saints, he be excluded from the body and blood of the Lord, and from the communion of the universal Church."[^43]
Iconoclastic Opposition Based on Dualism and Idolatry
Conversely, the Iconoclastic Council of Constantinople in 754 A.D. (held during the reign of Emperor Constantine, Leo III’s son, after both Gregory III and Leo III had passed in 741 A.D.) condemned image worship, grounding its stance in the biblical opposition to idolatry.
Footnotes:
42. Miller, Miller’s Church History from First to Twentieth Century, p. 292.
43. Miller, referencing Cathedra Petri, Vol. III, p. 480.
Iconoclastic Council’s Theological Argument Against Images
The Iconoclastic Council argued that Satan deceived people into worshipping creation instead of the Creator. Although the Mosaic Law and the prophets sought to correct this error, it was ultimately God’s sending of His Son that fully redirected humanity from idolatry to the worship of God “in spirit and in truth.”[^44] The council praised the church Fathers and the first six Ecumenical Councils for upholding this biblical faith but charged that Satan had subtly reintroduced idolatry under the guise of Christianity.
The council’s Christology emphasized preserving the doctrine of the Incarnation in alignment with the decisions of previous councils. They highlighted how the six Ecumenical Councils had condemned heresies that either divided or mingled the two natures of Christ. For instance, Nestorius was denounced for dividing “the One Son and Word of God into two sons,” while Arius, Dioscorus, Eutyches, and Severus were condemned for advocating a mingling of Christ’s divine and human natures.[^45]
The council argued that the practice of painting images of living beings violated the doctrine of the Incarnation. Since the Ecumenical Councils unanimously taught that no one should imagine any form of separation or mingling in the union of Christ’s two natures within one hypostasis (person), the Iconoclasts reasoned that depicting Christ as a mere man inherently misrepresented His divine nature.[^46]
Footnotes:
44. Percival, The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, p. 543.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
Iconoclastic Council’s Rejection of Images as Misrepresentations of Christ’s Nature
The Iconoclastic Council strongly condemned the depiction of Christ in images, asserting that any attempt to represent Him visually mingled His divine and human natures inappropriately. They argued that those who imagined they could depict the Godhead in an image were guilty of "double blasphemy"—both by creating an image of God and by merging Christ’s divinity and humanity, an error reminiscent of the heresies of Arius, Dioscorus, and Eutyches.[^47]
The council criticized those who claimed to depict only Christ’s humanity. They deemed this approach Nestorian, as it implied a separation between His human and divine natures, which orthodox Christology rejected. The council argued that Christ’s flesh was inseparably united with the divine Word, fully assumed and made divine. Representing His humanity separately, as if it could be isolated from His divinity, was unacceptable:
"When, however, they are blamed for undertaking to depict the divine nature of Christ, which should not be depicted, they take refuge in the excuse: We represent only the flesh of Christ which we have seen and handled. But that is a Nestorian error. For it should be considered that that flesh was also the flesh of God the Word, without any separation, perfectly assumed by the divine nature and made wholly divine. How could it now be separated and represented apart?"[^48]
The council’s arguments against separating the two natures included the point that Christ’s divinity remained united with His humanity even in His passion. Therefore, they questioned the legitimacy of artists attempting something that God Himself did not do. They argued that if artists depicted only Christ’s humanity, they effectively assigned it a separate personality, inadvertently introducing a "fourth person" into the Godhead—a view the council found deeply problematic.
Footnotes:
47. Percival, The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, p. 543.
48. Ibid., p. 544.
Iconoclastic Council’s Condemnation of Images and Its Aftermath
The Iconoclastic Council asserted that anyone creating an image of Christ either mistakenly mingles His divine and human natures (reflecting a Monophysite view) or separates His human nature from His divine nature, portraying Christ’s humanity as if it were a separate person, akin to the Nestorian error. They stated:
"Whoever, then, makes an image of Christ, either depicts the Godhead which cannot be depicted, and mingles it with the manhood (like the Monophysites), or he represents the body of Christ as not made divine and separate and as a person apart, like the Nestorians."[^49]
The council condemned these theological errors, or "anathematized" them, and extended its prohibition to all images, including those of saints and the Virgin Mary. Emperor Constantine enforced this ban for 34 years until his death.
Restoration of Image Veneration under Irene
Following Constantine’s death, his daughter-in-law Irene ascended to the throne and actively supported the veneration of images. Her policies led to the convening of the Second Council of Nicaea in 787 A.D., which officially restored and endorsed image worship. Although Charlemagne resisted this decree in the West, promoting a moderated stance on images through the Carolingian Books, the church overall adopted a sufficiently monistic Christological view to support the use of images.
The Seventh Ecumenical Council went so far as to anathematize anyone who applied biblical prohibitions against idolatry to Christian images. "...who presume to apply to the venerable images the things said in Holy Scripture about idols."[^50]
Footnote:
49. Percival, The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, p. 544.
50. Percival, The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, p. 551.
Monistic Christology of Liberalism
Liberalism, also known as neo-Protestantism, has been a powerful movement within Protestantism, steering it toward a more monistic view that emphasizes an essential unity between God and the universe. This influence has spread widely, particularly through organizational leadership and control of educational institutions. Although not all Protestant denominations have embraced this theology, liberalism has dominated leadership within many major denominations, prompting the creation of splinter groups by those who rejected its monistic theological and Christological perspective.
The controversy over liberalism has become a central issue within Protestantism over the past two centuries, representing a continuation of the age-old debate between monists and those who hold to a dualistic view of God as distinct from the world.
When examining the Christology of Liberalism, one might anticipate that its foundational presuppositions about the nature of reality would significantly shape its understanding of Christ. If a church embraces Kant’s idealism as the framework for its reality, what then is its conception of Christ? This question leads to a crucial inquiry: what kind of Christ would emerge from a commitment to monistic principles?
Monistic Christology in Liberalism: Schleiermacher’s Perspective
What kind of Christology arises when foundational assumptions lean towards monistic views such as Hegel’s idealism or Schleiermacher’s conception of God, which is grounded in human feelings and consciousness? Or, what happens when the church adopts a form of scientism that demands physical, tangible proof for Christ’s nature? Such beliefs would likely yield a Christology that lacks an ontologically transcendent view of Christ. Without affirming a God who is genuinely distinct from the world, the church would likely forgo a belief in Christ’s truly transcendent nature.
Schleiermacher’s Monistic Christology
Friedrich Schleiermacher, regarded as the father of Protestant liberalism, presented a view of God that he frequently equated with the “Universe.” He defined piety as a feeling of dependence, suggesting that all people possess some level of piety because all people have feelings through which God reveals Himself.[^51] For Schleiermacher, Christ was not central to religious experience; he famously stated, “It matters not what conceptions a man adheres to, he can still be pious.”[^52] His emphasis was instead on an intuition of the universe, which he viewed as the foundation of his religious understanding.
Footnotes:
51. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 93.
52. Ibid., p. 95.
Schleiermacher's Monistic Christology and View of God
Schleiermacher explained his religious perspective by asserting, “On intuition of the Universe my whole creed hinges,” describing it as the "highest formula of religion, determining its nature and fixing its boundaries.”[^53] For him, Christian faith was not centered in Christ but in the Universe and a person’s feeling of dependence on it. His view of the Universe was spiritual but not necessarily personal.
He clarified, “None who reflect on the little that is said about pantheism will suspect me of any materialistic pantheism… On the one side, everyone must recognize it as an almost absolute necessity for the highest stage of piety to acquire the conception of a personal God, and on the other, he will recognize the essential imperfection in the conception of a personality of the Highest Being.”[^54] Thus, Schleiermacher’s God was neither personal nor transcendent in the traditional sense.
Schleiermacher rejected the conventional view of God as a single, distinct being beyond the world, saying, “The usual conception of God as one single being outside of the world, behind the world, is not the beginning and the end of religion. It is only one manner of expressing God, seldom entirely pure and always inadequate.”[^55] He also dismissed the doctrine of the Trinity, viewing it as a speculative idea without Christian origins, stating, “If a philosopher…will attempt to prove a Trinity in the Highest Being, he does it at his risk, and I would maintain that this is not a Christian Trinity because, being a speculative idea, it has its origin in another part of the soul.”[^56] For Schleiermacher, the Trinity lacked significance as it did not arise from the realm of feelings central to his theology.
Footnotes:
53. Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, p. 278.
54. Ibid., p. 115.
55. Ibid., p. 101.
56. Ibid., p. 102.
Schleiermacher’s Emphasis on the Divinity of Feelings Over Christ’s Divinity
For Schleiermacher, the divinity within human feelings held greater significance than the divinity of Christ. He argued that true piety comes from the "divine in [one's] feeling," regardless of the specific doctrines one may hold. He explained:
“It matters not what conceptions a man adheres to, he can still be pious. His piety, the divine in his feeling, may be better than his conception. Many believe in and accept a God presented in conception, and yet are nothing less than pious, and in no case is this conception the germ from which their piety could ever spring, for it has no life in itself.”[^57]
Schleiermacher questioned the authenticity of the biblical portrayal of Christ, suggesting that the Gospel of John was not written by the apostle but by “a later writer” who “invented this mystic Jesus.”[^58] While he referred to Christ as “the center of all mediation,”[^59] he denied that Christ is the exclusive mediator between humanity and God. According to Schleiermacher, “He never maintained He was the only mediator, the only one in whom His idea actualized itself.”[^60]
Further, Schleiermacher argued that others could also serve as mediators. He wrote:
"Nay, a numerous party of Christians declare themselves ready to acknowledge everyone as a mediating and divine being who can prove, by a divine life or any impress of divineness, that he has been, for even a small circle, the first quickening of the higher sense.”[^61]
Footnotes:
57. Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, p. 95.
58. Ibid., p. 262.
59. Ibid., pp. 263-264.
60. Ibid., p. 248.
61. Ibid., pp. 249-250.
Schleiermacher’s Few References to Christ in On Religion
Schleiermacher’s book, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, which launched his fame, contains remarkably few references to Christ. This work, aimed at making Christianity more acceptable and appealing to its "despisers," appears to set a course for his followers toward a syncretistic acceptance of all religions, with minimal focus on the centrality of Christ.
Hegel’s Monistic Christology
Hegel’s dialectical idealism had a significant influence on Protestant Christology within Liberalism. In his Life of Jesus, Hegel viewed Christ simply as the son of Joseph and Mary, seeking to understand what aspects of Christ’s teachings contributed to His greatness.[^62] By seeing Christ as merely the son of Joseph, Hegel dismissed the orthodox view of Christ’s dual natures (fully divine and fully human).
In Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel stated, “The divine nature is the same as the human, and it is this unity which is intuitively apprehended (angeshaut).”[^63] By equating the divine nature with the human, Hegel clearly embraced a monistic view, asserting the unity of God and man. This belief in the essential sameness of divine and human nature shaped his Christology, further aligning it with monistic principles.
Footnotes:
62. Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 1124.
63. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1910, 1949), p. 760.
Hegel’s Monistic View of Incarnation
Hegel’s monistic Christology frames the "incarnation of the Divine Being" as the process by which the Divine becomes aware of itself as Spirit. In Hegel’s system, incarnation is not the unique union of divine and human natures in Jesus; instead, it represents the Divine Being achieving self-consciousness. He describes this as “the Divine Being’s consciousness concerning itself that it is Spirit,” meaning that Spirit is equivalent to self-consciousness.[^64][^65]
For Hegel, then, incarnation is not exclusive to Jesus but is wherever “self-consciousness” emerges. Williston Walker provides a comprehensive summary of Hegel's philosophy and its implications for Christology:
“To Hegel, the universe is a constant development of the Absolute, that is, God, through struggle and effort. The Absolute is spirit, and its development is in accordance with the laws by which mind thinks itself out logically. These always involve three stages, a movement in one direction—a thesis. This proceeds till it encounters its opposition or its limitation—the antithesis. But the two are but aspects of the one Absolute, and both thesis and antithesis unite in a higher union, the synthesis. Over against the ‘idea,’ the thesis, as its antithesis, is nature—but the two unite in the higher synthesis in man, who is the union of both mind and matter. Since all is the Absolute developing in accordance with the laws of all thought, the laws of thought are the laws of things; and since our thinking is a fragment of that of the Absolute, in so far as it is true, it gives us true knowledge of the things outside our minds, and is the same in all minds since a part of the one Absolute. Since we are portions of the Absolute come to consciousness, a prime duty of the finite spirit is to realize its relation to the Absolute—such realization is religion. Religion may, indeed, begin, as with Schleiermacher, in feeling; but to be true it must become real knowledge. Every religion is an attempt thus to know God, of which Christianity is the most complete realization. God is always striving to reveal Himself; yet this outworking must be through the three necessary stages of development. Thus the Father is the divine unity—the thesis. He objectifies Himself in the Son—the antithesis. The uniting love is the Holy Spirit—the synthesis. The whole process gives the Trinity.”[^66]
Hegel’s Concept of Incarnation in the Trinity Framework
In Hegel's framework, the incarnation is understood through a similar dialectical progression. Walker explains:
“So regarding the incarnation. God is the thesis. He is distinguished from finite humanity, the antithesis. Both unite in the higher synthesis, the God-man.”[^67]
Hegel’s thought appears to lean towards pantheism, as the Absolute unfolds itself through this dialectical process. Though Hegel was primarily a philosopher, his ideas significantly influenced theology, especially through his teaching positions in Jena, Nuremberg, Heidelberg, and the University of Berlin, as well as through his writings.[^68]
Strauss’s Monistic Christology and Anti-Supernatural Approach
David Friedrich Strauss, a disciple of Hegel, exerted substantial influence on liberal theology through his critical examination of the Gospels. In his Life of Jesus (1835), Strauss questioned core aspects of Jesus’ life and ministry, including the virgin birth, specific details of the crucifixion and resurrection, post-resurrection appearances, and many of Jesus’ sayings. Strauss sought to eliminate the supernatural elements of these accounts, either by offering natural explanations or by attributing them to myths that he believed arose between Jesus’ lifetime and the period when the evangelists composed their accounts.
Following this, Strauss published Christliche Glaubenslehre (1841-1842), in which he challenged traditional Christian doctrines by scrutinizing their historical development.[^69] Influenced by Hegel’s dialectical idealism and agreeing with Schleiermacher’s critical stance on Christian dogma, Strauss developed a worldview that rejected supernaturalism and embraced a monistic perspective. This perspective is evident in his reflections following his brother's death. In dedicating an edition of his work to his deceased brother, Strauss emphasized the sufficiency of a universe that requires no “supernatural aids,” leaving humanity to depend solely on "the natural order of the world.” He described this as “relying on that alone which you are able to be and to know as man and member of this divinely teeming world.”[^70]
In his Life of Jesus, Strauss concludes with a “Mythical History of Jesus,” which further elaborates on his anti-supernatural stance and monistic view of reality.
Footnotes:
66. Walker, A History of the Christian Church, p. 535.
67. Ibid.
68. Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 1124-1125.
69. Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity, p. 1128.
70. David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus for the People, Vol. II (Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1879), p. 439.
Strauss’s Rejection of the Supernatural and His Impact on Theology
In The Life of Jesus for the People, Strauss asserted that stripping Jesus of His supernatural attributes was a necessary and beneficial task. He explained:
“The critic is convinced that he is committing no offence against what is sacred, nay rather that he is doing a good and necessary work, when he sweeps away all that makes Jesus a supernatural Being, as well meant and perhaps even at first sight beneficial, but in the long run mischievous and now absolutely destructive, restores, as well as may be, the image of the historical Jesus in its simply human features, but refers mankind for salvation to the ideal Christ, to that moral pattern in which the historical Jesus did indeed first bring to light many principal features, but which as an elementary principle as much belongs to the general endowment of our kind, as its improvement and perfection can only be the problem and the work of mankind in general.”[^71]
Strauss’s idealistic monism, which led him to dismiss the supernatural and view the world as "divinely teeming," effectively barred him from employment within theological faculties. According to Latourette, Strauss ultimately “broke completely with his early faith and died a materialist and a pessimist.”[^72] Despite this, his writings had a profound impact. As Horton Harris noted, “It may also be argued that Strauss was the most important theologian of the century.”[^73] By questioning the historicity of Jesus, Strauss sparked the development of historical criticism. His last book, published in 1872, achieved unprecedented success in Germany, selling six large editions in six months, a remarkable feat for any theological or philosophical work.
Footnotes:
71. David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus for the People, Vol. II, p. 439.
72. Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity, p. 1128.
73. Horton Harris, David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. ix.
Christian Science's Monistic Christology
Christian Science, despite using traditional Christian terminology, assigns distinctly different meanings to familiar theological concepts. It refers to Christ as God’s Son, speaks of atonement, crucifixion, and the "Mind of Christ"—all terms that may appear orthodox to Christians. However, the underlying meaning in Christian Science is monistic.
For example, the Six Tenets of Christian Science acknowledge Christ as the Son of God but omit any reference to His two natures. When addressing atonement, Christian Science defines it as the "unfolding of man's unity with God," focusing on an inherent oneness rather than reconciling two distinct beings. Christ’s role in atonement is depicted as providing an example rather than acting as a Mediator on behalf of others. The crucifixion, in Christian Science’s interpretation, symbolizes Christ’s demonstration of His belief in the "nothingness of matter,"[^74] aligning with its doctrine that affirms the "allness of Soul, Spirit, and the nothingness of matter." Within this framework, the idea of two distinct natures—divine and human—is incompatible.
Footnote:
74. Lyman P. Powell, Mary Baker Eddy: A Life Size Portrait (New York: MacMillan Co., 1930), pp. 200-201.
Unity School of Christianity's Monistic Christology
Unity regards Christ primarily as an example, guiding humanity toward a progressive, evolutionary goal of personal and spiritual growth. As Unity explains:
"We believe that life is an eternal unfoldment. Life is an evolution. We are all growing, learning, unfolding—falling, perhaps over and over—but eventually we shall all stand 'in the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.'"[^75]
Unity affirms both Christ’s divinity and humanity, but this affirmation lacks the orthodox distinction between two natures. Charles Fillmore, a Unity founder, states, "We cannot separate Jesus Christ from God, or tell where man leaves off and God begins in Him." As Charles S. Braden comments in These Also Believe, "Here is a Christology high enough surely to satisfy the most exacting orthodox standards. Jesus Christ is God in incarnation, as we are God in aspiration. He embodies what we only envision. But He is the Man we all might be; His is the life toward which we are moving."[^76]
This passage begins with language that might suggest traditional beliefs in Christ’s dual natures, but ends with a clear monistic viewpoint that merges "Jesus Christ," "God," and humanity into one. Unity presents Jesus as God incarnate, while humans are God in aspiration, teaching that a dualistic separation between God and man is outdated. By rejecting a true dualism of Christ’s natures, Unity redefines Him as a transformative example of unity between God and humanity. Unity inherently requires a monistic framework, and this perspective is evident in its Christology. By redefining Christ as a monistic being, Unity presents Him as the revealer of a monistic God, merging God and humanity in aspiration and incarnation.
Footnotes:
75. James Dillet Freeman, "What is Unity?" Christian Herald (January, 1961), p. 80. Freeman mentions that Unity suggests reincarnation as a means of this unfolding process but does not insist upon it.
76. Ibid., p. 80.
The influence of monism on Christology has manifested across various theological frameworks, shaping perspectives on Christ’s nature and divinity.
Gnosticism
Gnosticism projected its metaphysical framework onto Christ, envisioning Him as a purely spiritual being, high on a monistic scale of emanations from Bythus, the "ocean" of pure spirit. This view starkly contrasted with orthodox Christianity’s dualistic understanding of Christ’s human and divine natures.The First Six Ecumenical Councils
The first six Ecumenical Councils firmly upheld the distinction between Christ’s human and divine natures, affirming that Christ embodied both without blending or separating them. This dualistic approach reinforced the uniqueness of Christ as both fully God and fully man.The Seventh Ecumenical Council
The Seventh Council marked a departure from this dualism by permitting images to represent both Christ’s divinity and humanity. This change blurred the line between the divine and human, diminishing the “otherness” of God by allowing Him to be visually represented like any human. This shift prepared the way for natural theology, which suggested that God could be known through nature.Protestant Liberalism
Protestant Liberalism further reduced the transcendent divide between God and creation, seeing God as closely aligned with nature. With its monistic worldview, liberal theology often downplayed or opposed Christ’s divinity, viewing God and the universe as a continuum. This outlook contributed to a broader reimagining of reality, which ultimately diminished the traditional view of Christ’s unique, transcendent divinity.Monistic Sects of the 19th and 20th Centuries
The 19th and 20th centuries saw the rise of monistic sects, reflecting monistic influences within parts of the church, particularly through the liberal movement. These sects embraced a unified, interconnected view of God and the universe, diverging from traditional dualistic views of God as wholly distinct from creation. Thus, they adopted a theological framework aligned with cultural shifts toward monism, mirroring the liberal redefinitions of Christology and divinity that had emerged within segments of the church.
In sum, monism's influence on Christology has gradually shifted certain theological approaches from the dualistic, orthodox understanding of Christ as both fully divine and fully human toward perspectives that merge or diminish these distinctions, shaping varied interpretations of Christ’s role, nature, and relationship to God and creation.
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